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“A Calculated and Terrible 
Efficiency”
The Operation Veritable Fire Plan, 
February 1945 
 
D AV I D  G R E B S T A D
Abstract : The First Canadian Army’s Operation Veritable, launched in 
early February 1945, aimed to drive the Germans from between the Maas 
and Rhine Rivers in order to establish the jumping off point for the 
Allied assault into the Rhineland. To support this attack, over a thousand 
guns were assembled from Canadian and British artilleries to smash 
and suppress the German defenders as the Anglo-Canadian manoeuvre 
forces advanced. Through innovation, guile and the use of new and more 
effective equipment, the gunners in support of First Canadian Army 
overcame challenging terrain and a weakened but nonetheless resolute 
enemy to enable the largest offensive operation of Canadian arms in the 
Second World War with what one Canadian Army historian referred to 
as a “calculated and terrible efficiency.”
Note to Readers: For ease of reference, a list of acronyms is provided at the 
end of this article (Appendix A).
In the sodden fIelds southeast of Nijmegen, Netherlands, the early morning quiet of 8 February 1945 was shattered by the 
unearthly din of the largest artillery bombardment undertaken by 
Commonwealth forces since the Battle of El Alamein in 1942. The fire 
plan was in support of the First Canadian Army’s drive to clear the 
enemy from between the Maas and Rhine Rivers and thus establish 
the jumping off point for the Allied crossing of the Rhine. Operation 
Veritable, as the assault was known, was the largest undertaking 
of Canadian arms during the Second World War; at one point in 
© Canadian Military History 2021
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2 “A Calculated and Terrible Efficiency”
the operation 450,000 personnel—Canadians, Britons, Poles and 
Dutch—found themselves in the ranks of the First Canadian Army. 
Over a thousand guns supported the assault with what a Canadian 
Army historian called a “calculated and terrible efficiency.”1 
This paper will provide a comprehensive analysis of the Veritable 
fire support plan and how that plan enabled the First Canadian Army 
to conduct its operation in the face of complex terrain, inclement 
weather, plentiful minefields and a determined, albeit sorely depleted, 
German Army. More specifically, this paper will demonstrate 
how the fire plan enabled First Canadian Army’s success through 
overwhelming fire support and innovative tactics that neutralised 
hostile batteries and suppressed German defensive positions. After 
conducting a brief survey of the strategic situation on the western 
front in early 1945, and the events that led to Veritable, this paper 
will lay out the manoeuvre plan devised by General (Gen.) Harry 
Crerar, commander of First Canadian Army, and Lieutenant-General 
(Lt.-Gen.) Brian Horrocks, commander of XXX British Corps, the 
lead assault formation. Thereafter, this paper will describe how the 
vast artillery organisation was brought together under utmost secrecy 
and executed the immense bombardment. Throughout the narrative, 
this article will highlight unique aspects of the fire plan, including 
the employment of novel equipment such as the 1st Canadian Rocket 
Battery, the first Canadian use of the proximity fuse airburst fuse 
and innovative tactics such as the employment of a feint smoke screen 
and an all-arms ‘pepper pot.’ In so doing, this article will illustrate 
how Canadian and Allied gunners enabled the largest operation 
undertaken by First Canadian Army during the Second World War. 
strategic situation
By December 1944, 21st Army Group under British Field Marshal 
Bernard Montgomery was poised to thrust into the Ruhr region, 
Germany’s industrial heartland. At a meeting on 6 December, 
Montgomery directed Crerar to plan an offensive operation directed 
to the southeast of Nijmegen and transferred XXX British Corps to 
First Canadian Army. On 16 December, as the Canadian and British 
1  War Diary [hereafter WD], 2nd Canadian Field Historical Section, February 1945, 
RG24-C-3, Volume 17507, File 1870, Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC]. 
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staffs were in the midst of their planning, German Field Marshal 
Gerd von Rundstedt launched the Ardennes offensive designed to 
drive a wedge between the Allied Army Groups and seize the port of 
Antwerp. Three days later, Montgomery placed Veritable on hiatus 
and transferred XXX British Corps and its subordinate formations 
to Second British Army for the Ardennes fight, leaving Crerar with 
I British and II Canadian Corps under his command. Elements of 
II Canadian Corps, particularly 2nd Canadian Division, were kept 
in the line to hold the position that would eventually become the 
Veritable start line while I British Corps remained poised northeast 
of Nijmegen to block any German incursion from that direction.
When von Rundstedt’s offensive was defeated, Montgomery 
directed Crerar to resume Veritable with a target start date of 10 
February 1945, a date which was later moved forward to 8 February, 
and returned to him XXX British Corps. Montgomery intended First 
Canadian Army’s operation to coincide with Operation Grenade, a 
converging offensive by the Ninth US Army, who were positioned 
further south. Meanwhile, the Second British Army was tasked with 
holding the terrain in the middle along the Meuse River.2 
The task before Crerar was a significant one. The area of 
operations between the Maas and the Rhine epitomised complex 
terrain. It was a narrow strip of land of rolling hills and dense forests 
with small villages interspersed. Looming large in the middle was 
the German national forest, the Reichswald. To make matters worse, 
the Germans breached a dike near the Waal River to the north, 
flooding the area, a situation that was later exacerbated when rising 
temperatures caused snow to melt and rivers to swell.3 
First Canadian Army was facing German General Kurt Arthur 
Benno Student’s Army Group H. In the area of operations, Student 
had the Twenty-Fifth Army in the north nearest First Canadian 
Army, while the First Para Army of four divisions was arrayed further 
south. The German defences southeast of Nijmegen were deployed 
along three lines of defence: a thinly held forward line; a more robust 
main line of defence known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line, which 
2  Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, Canadian Military 
Headquarters Historical Report No. 155 “Operation ‘Veritable’: The Winter Offensive 
between the Maas and the Rhine, 8-25 Feb 45 (Preliminary Report)” [hereafter 
CMHQ 155], 16 May 1946, 21-27.
3  CMHQ 155, 29.
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was supported by eight concrete casements and numerous anti-tank 
ditches arrayed in zig-zag style; and a third ‘lay back’ line, also known 
as the Hochwald Line, consisting of two lines of trenches supported 
by an anti-tank trench in between. In addition, the Germans created 
defensive positions between the lines by transforming the intervening 
towns and villages into strong points.4 Eight battalions held the 
forward line of defence, followed by another five in the reserve 
positions near the lay back line.5
the manoeuvre plan
First Canadian Army consisted of three corps—two British and 
one Canadian—the whole consisting of three armoured and seven 
infantry divisions, plus several independent infantry and armoured 
brigades. 
Crerar envisioned the assault taking place in three phases. Thirty 
British Corps was designated to be the tip of the spear for the first 
phase of clearing the Reichswald and securing a line between Gennep 
and Cleve. Thereafter, 2nd and 3rd Canadian Divisions would revert 
4  CMHQ 155, 18-19.
5  CMHQ 155, 19-20.
I British Corps II Canadian Corps XXX British Corps






49th West Riding Div
2nd Canadian 
Armoured Bde









6th Guards Armoured Bde
8th Armoured Bde
34th Armoured Bde
Table 1: First Canadian Army order of battle for the initial phase of Veritable.
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to II Canadian Corps under the command of Lt.-Gen. Guy Simonds 
and the two corps would breach the enemy’s second defensive line 
southeast of the Reichswald along the line Weeze—Cleve. Finally, 
maintaining a two-corps frontage, the Army would break through the 
final German defences and secure a line between Geldern—Xanten. 
Throughout the whole operation, I British Corps would maintain the 
charade that they intended to move north-westerly towards Utrecht 
in order to keep the Germans from dispatching reinforcements from 
this area to blunt the main attack.6
For the initial stages of the attack, Horrocks had under his 
command a massive Anglo-Canadian assault force. On the southern 
flank, with its right shoulder pressed up against the Maas River, the 
51st Highland Division was tasked to open up the route from Mook 
through Gennep and Hekkens to the town of Goch. To its left, 
the 53rd Welsh Division would capture Brandenburg and clear the 
high ground running through the northern part of the Reichswald, 
thereafter capturing the high ground around Stoppelberg. Further 
north, the 15th Scottish Division had the priority tasks of capturing 
the high ground around Kranenburg and then breaching the German 
Siegfried defences north of the Reichswald, particularly the key 
terrain of the Nutterdern feature followed by the Matterborn feature 
from which observation of the area southeast of the Reichswald 
could be gained. To the left of the Scots, the men of 2nd and 
3rd Canadian Divisions were assigned the ground north of the 
Nijmegen—Cleve road and south of the Rhine with the unenviable 
task of opening the roads and protecting the left flank of 15th 
Scottish Division. This was particularly challenging for the men of 
the 3rd Canadian Division who were relegated the inundated low 
ground of the Army’s northern flank.
Four divisions, 51st Highland, 53rd Welsh, 15th Scottish and 2nd 
Canadian, were scheduled to cross the line of departure at H-hour, 
1030 hrs, while 3rd Canadian Division planned to move out seven 
hours later at 1730 hrs. In reserve were 43rd Wessex Division and 
Guards Armoured Division. Horrocks intended the former to pass 
through 15th Scottish and capture Goch, while the latter was meant 
to follow their Welsh confreres forward and then advance southeast. 
Horrocks knew this would be tricky. He recognised almost 
immediately that he would have to smash through the German 
6  CMHQ 155, 14.
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defences with sheer brute force rather than deft manoeuvre. The use 
of artillery, he concluded, was an absolute necessity. 
Fortunately, there was plenty of artillery. The senior gunner in 
the First Canadian Army, the Brigadier Royal Artillery (BRA), was 
Brigadier (Brig.) Edward Chester Plow. Plow had at his disposal a 
total of 938 field, medium, heavy and super-heavy guns augmented 
with 96 heavy anti-aircraft guns employed in a ground role. Although 
Plow, as the BRA, held overall responsibility for the Army Fire Plan, 
as XXX British Corps was the assault formation for the first phase 
of the operation, he delegated most of his duties to the Commander 
Corps Royal Artillery (CCRA) in XXX British Corps, Brig. Stuart 
Blundell Rawlins. 
The majority of the fire support was found in the divisional 
artilleries. By the time of Veritable, Commonwealth artillery doctrine 
stipulated that every division had as part of its organisation a 
Divisional Artillery (DA), known as a Canadian Divisional Artillery 
(CDA) in the Canadian Army, under command of the Commander 
Royal Artillery (CRA), an artillery officer with the rank of brigadier. 
Image 1: Operation Veritable. [CMHQ Report 155]
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A divisional artillery consisted of three regiments of field artillery, 
each with three batteries of eight 25-pounder howitzers, as well as 
anti-tank and anti-aircraft regiments. 
In addition to the divisional artilleries, each CRA was allocated 
extra field or medium regiments to bolster his firepower. As shown 
in Table 4 below, the medium regiments in support of the divisions 
had been allocated from the Army Groups, Royal Artillery (AGRA) 
that were attached to First Canadian Army. An AGRA typically 
consisted of one heavy regiment of 7.2- or 8-inch howitzers or 155-
mm guns, three medium regiments of 4.5- or 5.5-inch guns and one 
or two regiments of 25-pounders. In the Corps artillery, Rawlins had, 
in addition to the divisional artilleries, five AGRAs: 3rd, 4th, 5th and 
9th British AGRAs as well as 2nd Canadian AGRA. 
The command relationship is important. The superior formation 
for which an artillery organisation was “under command” was 
responsible for the administration and deployment of the unit, 
whereas those organisations designated as “in support” provided 
fire support to the superior formation but their deployment and 
sustainment were the responsibility of another organisation, usually 
a higher artillery formation.
First Canadian Army also had the support of a novel Canadian 
organisation, the 1st Canadian Rocket Battery. Under the leadership 
of Gen. Crerar and several British staff officers with an interest in 
developing rocket ordnance, a Land Service Mattress Party, as the 
equipment was named, was created at the Canadian School of Artillery 
in England to develop the tactics, techniques and procedures for the 
use of rocket artillery. They began their work in September 1944 and 
at the end of the month brought their equipment to mainland Europe 
where 112th Battery of the 6th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA 
Field Regiment
24 x 25-pounder 
howitzers
(3 batteries of 8 guns)
Field Regiment
24 x 25-pounder 
howitzers
(3 batteries of 8 guns)
Field Regiment
24 x 25-pounder 
howitzers
(3 batteries of 8 guns)
Anti-Tank Regiment
4 x Anti-Tank Batteries
Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment
3 x Light Anti-Aircraft Batteries
Table 2: Organisation of a Divisional Artillery/Canadian Divisional Artillery during Veritable.
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was transformed into a rocket battery to refine rocket doctrine. The 
battery consisted of twelve “projectors” which were two-wheel trailers 
mounting 32 light-gauge tubes. Each tube fired a three-inch rocket 
with a 29-pound high explosive warhead to ranges between 4,000 
and 8,000 yards.7 The rockets were fired using a ripple effect with a 
quarter second between launches so that the rockets did not hit each 
other in flight. In one salvo, the twelve projectors fired an impressive 
total of 384 rockets that produced an impact area of approximately 
700 square yards.8 The salvos produced “a very concentrated lethal 
effect…against [troops] in the open or protected only by light field 
works.”9 Due to the lack of splinters produced, the value in the rocket 
was principally in its blast and ability to shock troops, thus it was 
used primarily on targets just before the arrival of the infantry to 
stun the enemy.10
After successful tests, the Rocket Battery proceeded to the 
Breskens area and fired two salvoes in support of an assault by No. 
4 Commando, Royal Marines. Unfortunately, the effectiveness of the 
7  List of BRA 1st Cdn Army Files Received from D Arty, Feb 50 – Memoranda, 
“Report on Rocket Demonstration 3 Feb 45,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10673, File 
215C1.2009 (D4), LAC.
8  G. W. L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal Regiment 
of Canadian Artillery, Volume II 1919-1967 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1972), 377n
9  List of BRA 1st Cdn Army Files Received from D Arty, Feb 50 – Memoranda, 
“Report on Rocket Demonstration 3 Feb 45,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10673, File 
215C1.2009 (D4), LAC. 
10  Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA 
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 4, RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC.
AGRA Headquarters
3rd Canadian Medium 
Regiment
16 x 4.5-inch guns
(2 batteries of 8 guns)
4th Canadian Medium 
Regiment
16 x 5.5-inch guns
(2 batteries of 8 guns)
7th Canadian Medium 
Regiment
16 x 5.5-inch guns
(2 batteries of 8 guns)
10th Medium Regiment, RA
16 x 5.5-inch guns
(2 batteries of 8 guns)
1st Heavy Regiment, RA
16 x 155mm guns
(4 batteries of 4 guns)
Table 3: Organisation of 2nd Canadian AGRA during Operation Veritable.
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unit was hard to assess. The battery fired operationally again in 
early November 1944 in support of 1st Polish Armoured Division near 
Moerdijk to much better results. Shortly thereafter, British gunners 
replaced the men of 112th Battery and later fired in support of 15th 
Scottish Division near Venlo in the Ardennes region. Finally, on 23 
December, the Canadian Army formed the 1st Canadian Rocket 
Battery and fully manned it with Canadian gunners. 
In his address to his subordinate commanders, Crerar advised:
In my opinion, there is no more important weapon in the armour 
of war than surprise. There are, on occasions, tactical problems for 
which the only sensible answer is prolonged fire preparation before the 
assault – even though such [fire] nullifies surprise[.]… [Obtain] maximum 
surprise by eliminating prolonged preliminary bombardment prior to 
division under command in support
a s s a u l t  d i v i s i o n s
15th Scottish Div
15th Scottish Divisional Artillery
86th Field Regt (SP), RA
147th Field Regt, RA
84th Medium Regt, RA
51st Highland Div
51st Highland Divisional Artillery
6th Field Regt, RA
79th Medium Regt, RA
53rd Welsh Div
53rd Welsh Divisional Artillery
19th Field Regt (SP), RCA
72nd Medium Regt, RA
2nd Canadian Div 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery 4th Medium Regt, RCA
3rd Canadian Div 3rd Canadian Divisional Artillery 7th Medium Regt, RCA
r e s e r v e  d i v i s i o n s
43rd Wessex Div 43rd Wessex Divisional Artillery 121st Medium Regt, RA
Guards Armoured Div Guards Divisional Artillery 64th Medium Regt, RA
(SP) = Self-propelled. Artillery pieces mounted on armoured chassis.
Table 4: Allocation of artillery units to divisions during Operation Veritable.
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the initiation of movement, and substituting for it a really overwhelming 
fire, from the air, if possible, as well as from the artillery, and the 
mortars, as the advance to close with the enemy commences, or is just 
about to commence.11
With this direction, a lengthy preliminary bombardment in the vein 
of the week-long bombardment of Vimy Ridge in 1917 was out of 
the question.
The task fell to Rawlins to devise the fire plan. The CCRA 
held his first planning conference with the CRAs and artillery 
leadership on 26 January 1945, although three days previous his staff 
had distributed “Royal Artillery Planning Notes No. 2” to guide 
the artillery planning.12 Rawlins issued the fire plan as “RA XXX 
British Corps Operation Instruction No. 32 – Operation Veritable” on 
3 February 1945.13 
Rawlins laid out three objectives for the fire plan: firstly, 
neutralise all known enemy batteries; secondly, destroy all known 
headquarters and communications nodes; and finally, suppress the 
enemy in the line of advance of the infantry.14 The fire plan consisted 
of three elements, the first of which was a five-hour period of artillery 
preparation that included a deceptive smoke screen. Preparatory fire, 
Rawlins articulated, was intended “to stupefy the enemy defences 
prior to H Hr and by the judicious use of smoke on both flanks to 
blind the form up and move to the start line from the possible enemy 
OPs [Observation Posts].”15 The second element of the fire plan was 
a standing barrage of smoke and high explosive of an hour’s duration 
designed to allow the infantry to form up on the start line. The 
11  GS Matters - Corresp, messages, memoranda, lectures, reviews, etc, re Op 
“Veritable,” d/10 Dec 44/8 May 45, “Address given to Senior Offrs of 1st Cdn Army 
by Gen HDG Crerar re Op ‘Veritable,’ d/22 Jan 45,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10466, 
File 212C1.2009 (D80), LAC.
12  WD, Headquarters, No. 2 Army Group, Royal Canadian Artillery, 23 January 
1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 14317, File 1158, LAC.
13  “RA XXX British Corps Operation Instruction No. 32. Operation VERITABLE,” 
3 February 1945, RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10467, File 212C1.2009 (D83), LAC.
14  Brigadier A. L. Pemberton, The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment 
(London: The War Office, 1951), 264.
15  OPERATIONS - “VERITABLE” - XXX British Corps Planning Notes, “CCRA 
Conference,” RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10467, File 212C1.2009 (D83), LAC.
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third and final element of the fire plan was a protective barrage that 
supported the attacking forces during their advance.16 
In the days prior to the operation, the units destined to join 
First Canadian Army were scattered throughout the region anywhere 
from 50-100 miles away from Nijmegen. A major logistical effort 
was required to assemble them in time and it had to be conducted 
in utmost secrecy. In late January, the units were withdrawn from 
their areas of operations and concentrated near the town of Louvain 
which lay between Antwerp and Boxtel. Starting on 5 February, they 
began to move into their assembly areas. To complicate matters, the 
weather warmed and turned the formerly ice and snow-bound roads 
into quagmires of oozing mud.17 
Assembling the massive amounts of ammunition required in the 
forward area, without exposing Allied intentions to the Germans, 
was particularly challenging. While the deployment of guns into 
firing positions could be delayed until the last possible moment, the 
sheer scope of the planned ammunition expenditure necessitated a 
herculean logistical effort over several weeks to position ammunition 
in the allocated gun areas. 
Crerar recalled that if the total ammunition allotment for 
Veritable, which consisted of 350 different types, were stacked side 
by side and five feet high, it would line a road for thirty miles.18 In 
order to maintain the deception plan, the artillery ammunition, which 
alone totalled 500,000 rounds and weighed a total of 11,000 tons, 
had to be brought forward during periods of darkness, over sodden 
16  CMHQ 155, 16.
17  CMHQ 155, 22.
18  Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, Volume II, 402.
Table 5: Veritable artillery dumping programme. [Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics 
and Equipment, 262]




155 mm gun 100
8-inch gun 140
240 mm howitzer 80
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and muddy roads, dropped on battery positions, placed in trenches 
dug during previous periods of darkness and then camouflaged—
all before sunrise.19 For this, First Canadian Army was indebted to 
the efforts of the gunners of 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery who 
were not only responsible for receiving and camouflaging their own 
ammunition, but they were also responsible for receiving, stacking and 
camouflaging the ammunition of 43rd and 53rd Divisional Artilleries 
who would later occupy positions in the 2nd Canadian Division area 
between D-14 and D-day.20 This was no light work. Captain (Capt.) 
George Blackburn, an officer with the 4th Field Regiment, RCA 
recalled that trenches for ammunition were approximately 30 cubic 
yards in size, requiring the excavation of thirty tons of soil.21 In one 
instance that must have been maddening, 400 rounds that had been 
dumped near 16 Battery of 12th Field Regiment, RCA were found to 
be unserviceable due to flooding in the pits.22
Amongst the ammunition that was dropped at the gun positions 
was a new weapon which revolutionised the way that war is 
conducted: the proximity fuse. Officially designated Variable Time 
or VT so as not to divulge to Germans how it operated and known 
colloquially to the gunners as the Peter fuse, the proximity fuse 
augmented the stores of mechanical time-fuses as tools to produce 
airburst explosions. Hitherto, mechanical time fuses employed an 
internal clockwork mechanism designed to detonate the projectile in 
the air and shower the target with shell fragments. Unfortunately, 
the inherent distribution of fire caused by non-standard conditions 
such as air density, charge temperature, wind and the like meant 
it was extremely difficult to achieve a consistent detonation at the 
optimum height of burst. Proximity fuses, however, housed a radar 
emitter in the nose of the fuse that detected and detonated when 
the round was at the optimum height, approximately 20-30 feet.23 
The results were devastating. The first Allied use of the fuse was 
19  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 263.
20  Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA 
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 2 RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC.
21  George G. Blackburn, The Guns of Victory (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 
1996), 235.
22  WD, 12th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 1 April 1945, RG24-C-3, 
Volume 14462, File 705, LAC.
23  Major G. S. J. Bowell, The History of the Brigadier Royal Artillery Branch of 
Headquarters First Canadian Army (Holland: n.p., 1945), 72.
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by the 12th US Artillery Group on 28 December 1944 near St. Vith 
and a 1st US Army Field Artillery report recorded that “it is hard 
to believe, but the cumulative figures indicate 2,000 enemy dead, 
which could be observed and counted…VT ammunition is most 
deadly.”24 The historian of the 12th Field Regiment, RCA remarked 
that when a target was engaged at “high angle,” which is to say an 
initial trajectory of 45 degrees or greater, there would be no sound of 
the round flying in the air as it descended toward the target. When 
the proximity fuse detonated above the enemy without any warning 
whatsoever, it provided “a very disagreeable surprise for the Hun.”25
In the lead-up to Veritable, a number of artillery technicians 
visited First Canadian Army to lecture on the use the proximity 
fuse. Secrecy was so important as there was concern about rounds 
falling into enemy hands, thus the authority to actually use the 
fuse was held at a very high level. In fact, CCRA XXX British 
Corps directed that VT fuses were not to be fired on D-day between 
0830 hrs and 1730 hrs without permission from XXX British Corps 
artillery headquarters. Outside this period, CRAs were delegated to 
authorise their use.26
The preparation of the artillery positions was also challenging. 
The overall reconnaissance and occupation plan fell to Rawlins 
whose staff faced the dilemma of finding sufficient gun areas for 
the plentiful batteries in a narrow strip of terrain extending six-by-
two miles and consisting of numerous tree plantations and inundated 
fields.27 No reconnaissance of gun positions was permitted to occur 
earlier than forty-eight hours before the guns were scheduled to arrive 
and absolutely no British vehicles were allowed near the front so the 
gunners of 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery had to chauffeur their 
British colleagues about the battlefield during their visits.28 Starting 
2 February, roads were closed to anything but essential traffic and 
any vehicle moving at night required the authorisation of no less 
24  Maj.-Gen. J. B. A. Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower (Annapolis: Naval 
Institute Press, 2001), 323 n127.
25  Capt. T. J. Bell, Into Action with the 12th Field (Ottawa: Queens Printer, 
1945), 106.
26  OPERATIONS - “VERITABLE” - XXX British Corps Planning Notes, RG24-G-
3-1-a, Volume 10467, File 212C1.2009 (D83), LAC.
27  Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, Volume II, 403.
28  Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, Volume II, 403; and R. B. Dale Harris, The Six 
Years of 6 Canadian Field Regiment Royal Canadian Artillery, September, 1939 – 
September, 1945 (n.p.: Bilthoven, 1945), 88.
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than a brigadier. Consequently, the 6th Field Regiment Headquarters 
officers’ dance was ruined “for a lack of girls.”29 Their colleagues in 11 
Battery, 12th Field Regiment, RCA were equally chagrined to cancel 
a dance for which the services of the band of the Guards Division 
had been secured.30 Regardless of when the reconnaissance occurred, 
no digging of gun pits or command posts was permitted before D-1.31
By D-3, guns began deploying into the area. Like the ammunition 
dumping programme, the occupation of new gun positions occurred 
at night. Some of the routes available were mere cart tracks that had 
turned soft and muddy. In one instance, the Gun Position Officer of 
a heavy battery had to guide each gun to its position individually, 
proceeding it on foot along a narrow path, guiding the driver of the 
gun tractor by a flashlight with two layers of heavy paper wrapped 
around it to dim the light.32 
On D-2, 6 February, graphical descriptions of each battery’s 
targets and fire tasks, known as traces, were delivered to the batteries 
partaking in Veritable. The various command posts thereafter spent 
a busy forty-eight hours making the necessary calculations to engage 
their assigned targets.33 The war diarist of the 13th Field Regiment, 
RCA remarked that when the traces were handed out to the adjutant 
and battery command posts they “received quite a shock, this [fire 
plan] being the biggest yet.”34 
The immense challenge of cobbling together the artillery left 
many senior officers nervous. The historian of the BRA Branch 
recalled that “the move program was so tight and fraught with the 
possibility of errors and lagging schedules that the BRA [Plow], in 
a temporary mood of exasperation, jokingly wagered a substantial 
number of guilders that all the artillery would not be in position and 
ready by H-hour.” Fortunately, by the evening of 7 February, the 
whole of the artillery allocated to support First Canadian Army in 
Veritable was in place and ready to begin the fire plan—“the staff 
29  Dale Harris, The Six Years, 89.
30  WD, 12th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 2 February 1945, RG24-C-3, 
Volume 14462, File 705, LAC.
31  Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA 
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 2, RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC. 
32  Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 403. 
33  Bell, Into Action with the 12th Field, 111.
34  WD, 13th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 7 February 1945, RG24-C-3, 
Volume 14466, File 706, LAC. 
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heaved a sigh of relief. The BRA smiled.”35 As the BRA and his staff 
modestly celebrated, the dull hum of an armada of bombers was 
heard overhead. 
Up to 1,000 fighters, 100 medium-day and 90 medium-night 
bombers and up to 1,000 heavy bombers from Bomber Command, 
Second Tactical Air Force and 8th and 9th US Army Air Forces 
supported Veritable. In addition, close air support consisted of fifty-
nine squadrons from 83 and 84 Groups, Royal Air Force. Impromptu 
air support was provided by an overhead “cab rank” system in which 
a certain number of aircraft were kept circling over friendly lines until 
directed to a target by the Forward Control Post, located at XXX 
British Corps Headquarters. In the leading divisions, Contact Cars, 
which were forward air control parties with radio contact between 
aircraft and the infantry, were available to direct the aircraft onto 
the target.36 
Bombing was scheduled to begin the evening of 7 February 
followed by a continuous combination of programmed and impromptu 
support from the air. Over eighty targets were provided to the air 
forces for engagement during the preliminary bombardment, ranging 
in nature from bridges over the Rhine to fortified enemy positions. 
The Canadian Military Historical Report on Operation Veritable 
described the terrible fury that was to be dispensed from the air in 
rather dispassionate terms: 
The towns of Cleve and Goch, key points northeast and southeast 
of the Reichswald, were to be totally destroyed, as were all buildings 
housing enemy troops in Weeze, Udem, Calcar, Kranenburg and several 
other smaller places. Numerous bridges railway lines and junctions, 
fuel and ammunition dumps, telephone communications and enemy 
headquarters were listed with precise instructions as to how they were 
to be destroyed, whether by high explosive or by fire.37 
35  Bowell, The History of the Brigadier Royal Artillery Branch, 71.
36  Major L. F. Ellis, Victory in the West, Volume 2 The Defeat of Germany (London: 
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1968), 256. 
37  CMHQ 155, 15-16.
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On D+1, concentrated attacks on Geldern, Kempen and Huls were 
scheduled to interrupt the movement of the enemy’s reserves.38
The decision to destroy several towns with air bombardment was 
not one taken lightly. Horrocks recalled in his memoir that Crerar 
approached him one day during the lead-up to the operation and asked 
if he wanted Cleve “taken out.” Horrocks related that he knew that 
many civilians, including women and children, were still in the city, 
however, it was tactically important terrain through which German 
reserves would have to pass in order to block the advance of 15th 
Scottish Division. He knew that destroying the town would delay the 
German reinforcement and give him a tactical advantage. He wrote: 
“So I said ‘Yes’ – the most terrible decision I had ever had to take in 
my life, and I can assure you that I felt almost physically sick when…I 
saw the bombers flying overhead on their deadly mission…After the 
war, I used to suffer from nightmares and literally for years these 
always concerned Cleve.”39
On the evening of 7 February over 400 heavy bombers dropped 
1,875 tons of high explosive on Cleve.40 The war diarist of 13th 
Field Regiment remarked that “a good view was had by all from 
the regimental position.”41 George Blackburn of 4th Field Regiment, 
RCA later wrote that:
the pulsating roar of the first wave is heard passing over on its way to 
bomb the first major town in the path of the attack…the southeastern 
sky is first lit by flares, then sparkling ack-ack, as great flashes begin 
along the horizon. For a time, there is only the sound of the planes 
growling overhead, but then comes the ground shuddering string of 
crumps you’ve learned to associate with aerial bombing. Cleve is at 
least ten miles away, but the violence of the flashing explosions at times 
lights up the whole cloudy dome of the sky.42
38  Historical Section, Canadian Military Headquarters, Canadian Military 
Headquarters Historical Report No. 185: “Operation ‘Veritable’: The Winter 
Offensive between the Maas and the Rhine, 8-25 Feb 45” [hereafter CMHQ 185], 24 
September 1947, 36.
39  Sir Brian Horrocks, Eversley Belfied and Maj.-Gen. H. Essame, Corps Commander 
(Toronto: Griffin House, 1977), 183-84.
40  Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 404.
41  WD, 13th Field Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 8 February 1945, RG24-C-3, 
Volume 14466, File 706, LAC. 
42  Blackburn, The Guns of Victory, 238-39.
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As the bombers pounded away at their targets, the gunners of First 
Canadian Army kept up the same pattern and scale of harassing fire 
against the enemy as they had for the previous several weeks so as 
to not alert the Germans to the mass of artillery waiting to fire.43
D-day, 8 February, dawned grey and rainy. At 0500 hrs the fire 
plan began. “All hell let loose,” wrote the historian of the 6th Field 
Regiment, RCA. “We had seen some pretty big [bombardments] but 
this topped them all.”44 Blackburn recalled standing in the battery 
position, overawed by the silence until “one faint, distant voice yells, 
Fire! And for a split second there’s a rising chorus of urgent voices on 
all sides yelling Fire!... the night is overwhelmed by furious, flashing 
roaring waves of sound and concussion, rending and tearing the 
darkness with monstrous, theatrical effects.”45 Horrocks was perched 
in an observation post constructed for him by the Royal Engineers 
consisting of a platform halfway up a tree and recalled that “the noise 
was unbelievable.”46
Firing continued for the next two and a half hours as the 
preliminary bombardment hammered known and suspected German 
positions. At precisely 0730 hrs the feint smoke screen began building 
across the whole of the Corps front until 0740 hrs when all firing 
ceased and an eerie quiet fell over the battlefield. The silence was 
broken by 2 Battery, 4th Field Regiment, RCA when a round left 
in the breech of a 25-pounder, its barrel glowing red from the heat 
of two and a half hours of intense firing, detonated prematurely, 
splitting the barrel of the gun. Fortunately, no one was injured.47
As planned, the sound rangers, flash spotters and Forward 
Observation Officers waited intently for German guns to engage 
defensive fire tasks. A moment should be spared here to discuss 
counter-battery fire in support of Veritable. The German artillery, 
although much depleted since the invasion of Normandy, still posed 
a threat to Allied troops exposed during the advance. Fortunately, 
the deception plan employed by the First Canadian Army convinced 
the Germans that the attack was not coming from the direction 
of Nijmegen, thus the Germans did not reinforce the artillery of 
43  Bell, Into Action with the 12th Field, 112.
44  Dale Harris, The Six Years, 89.
45  Blackburn, The Guns of Victory, 243.
46  Horrocks et al., Corps Commander, 184.
47  Blackburn, The Guns of Victory, 248.
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the 84th Division. Nonetheless, the German 84th Division had 114 
howitzers at its disposal.48 It is no surprise, then, that the first 
objective of the fire plan was the neutralisation of the German 
artillery and mortar threat.
Prior to the beginning of preparatory fire, the counter-battery 
programme was the responsibility of the CCRA of II Canadian Corps, 
who was tasked to maintain normal counter-battery activity up until 
0500 hrs. During this period, only the artillery already deployed as 
part of 2nd Canadian Division was authorised to fire in order to 
reinforce the deception plan and convince the Germans the attack 
would not come from Nijmegen. After 0500 hrs, the Commander of 5 
AGRA assumed responsibility for counter-battery work until H-hour, 
when counter-battery tasks were decentralised to the commanders 
of 2nd Canadian and 5th and 9th AGRAs.49 In the days leading 
up to the operation, the First Canadian Army identified forty-five 
hostile battery locations. During the preliminary bombardment, a 
concentration was scheduled to engage each of the identified German 
batteries with an average Allied-to-German gun ratio of 40:1. 
Finding the enemy was of course of extreme importance. To 
assist with target identification, XXX British Corps was allocated 
the support of two Air Observation Post squadrons, 660 and 662.50 
Each squadron had sixteen aircraft and nineteen pilot-observers, 
organised into three flights each with four sections of a single aircraft 
and pilot.51 All of the divisions, less the Guards Armoured Division, 
were allocated a “flight” from the squadron.
Counter-mortar fire was equally important. As the force on the 
ground, the CRA of 2nd Canadian Division was initially tasked with 
the counter-mortar duties for the whole of First Canadian Army up 
until H-hour. In his report on Veritable, the CRA of 2nd Canadian 
Division recalled that while “the pre-H hour bombardment was 
actually ordered by CCRA of XXX British Corps… the bombardment 
48  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 263.
49  “RA XXX British Corps Operation Instruction No. 32. Operation VERITABLE,” 
3 February 1945, 5, RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10467, File 212C1.2009 (D83), LAC.
50  CMHQ 185, 36.
51  “Other Firepower,” British Artillery in World War 2, accessed 15 September 2020, 
http://nigelef.tripod.com/otherfp.htm#AOP.
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tables were prepared by [the Counter Mortar Officer]” of 2nd 
Canadian Division.52 
The 2nd Canadian Division Counter Mortar Officer had at 
his disposal twenty observation posts, two radars and two mortar 
locators to locate German mortars, as well as the dedicated fire of ten 
7.2-inch howitzer batteries of four guns each to engage the mortars 
when they were located.53 After H-hour, the responsibility for counter-
mortar fire reverted to the assaulting divisions, each being allocated 
the fire from a medium artillery regiment and two 7.2-inch howitzer 
batteries. 
Unmasking of enemy artillery during the feint smokescreen 
proved underwhelming. The artillery staff of 2nd Canadian Division 
found that few of the German batteries revealed themselves and 
the gunners assumed this was because most had been neutralised 
during the preliminary bombardment.54 Indeed, an intelligence report 
indicated that between 0515 and 1000 hrs on 8 February, only ten 
artillery rounds were fired by the Germans. The overwhelming fire 
superiority of the First Canadian Army is reflected in the following 
observation by XXX British Corps: “At 0900 hrs a single medium 
gun which had been located by Sound Rangers was bombarded by 
four Medium [Regiments].”55 In the same report, the XXX British 
Corps Counter Battery Officer noted that on the morning of 8 
February, five counter-battery neutralisation programmes were fired 
involving a total of 1,000 guns and the expenditure of almost 35,000 
rounds of ammunition.56 While most German batteries remained 
silent, nineteen enemy mortars unadvisedly opened fire during this 
lull in the preparatory bombardment. The counter mortar staff easily 
52  Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA 
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 2, RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC. 
53  Pemberton, The Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 265.
54  Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA 
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC
55  WD, 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA, “XXX British Corps Counter Battery 
Intelligence Report No. 150,” RG24-C-3, Volume 14390, Reel T-15906, File 1050, 
LAC, accessed 19 September 2020, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_
reel_t15906/166?r=0&s=3. Emphasis added.
56  WD, 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA, “XXX British Corps Counter Battery 
Intelligence Report No. 150.” RG24-C-3, Volume 14390, Reel T-15906, File 1050, 
accessed 19 September 2020, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_
t15906/166?r=0&s=3.
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located them and twenty-three mortar targets were engaged before 
the assaulting waves crossed the start line.57
At 0750 hrs the preliminary bombardment restarted. Following 
this, at 0915 hrs, another smoke screen began to build along the left 
flank of the infantry to screen them as they moved forward toward 
the forming up position just behind the start line. At 0920 hrs a 
mixture of high explosive and smoke artillery rounds were fired on 
the starting line of the barrage, slowing increasing in intensity. To 
this was added the intense all arms fire of the pepper pot. 
By the time of Veritable, the use of pepper pots was standard 
practice during Allied operations.58 Essentially, a pepper pot was the 
use of weapon systems, such as machine guns, tanks and anti-aircraft 
guns, to fire indirectly at designated targets using map-calculated 
bearing and elevation with the intent of suppressing the enemy with 
overwhelming fire and thus interdict reinforcement, ammunition supply 
and communication.59 The Veritable pepper pot was programmed to 
be fired in the sixty minutes before H-hour “to saturate the enemy 
defences on the front and flanks of the attack with fire from all types 
of weapons.”60 Major G. S. J. Bowell, author of the BRA Branch’s 
history, put it more prosaically when he wrote that the point of the 
pepper pot was to “convince the enemy that it would be suicidal to 
move or come out above ground.”61 The Commanders of 51st Highland 
Division and 2nd Canadian Division coordinated the pepper pot with 
their areas of responsibility divided geographically down the centre 
of the XXX British Corps area of operations. Both commanders 
were allocated all light anti-aircraft and medium machine guns in 
their area of responsibility as well as a regiment of tanks from 8th 
Armoured Brigade. Commander 2nd Canadian Division also received 
two towed anti-tank batteries from XXX British Corps troops.62 The 
amount of ammunition allocated to these units was staggering; the 
designated units of 2nd Canadian Division alone fired 1,300,000 
57  Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 406.
58  Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 353.
59  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 264.
60  XXX British Corps Operation Instruction No. 45, “Operation ‘VERITABLE’ 
Organisation of pepper pots,” 27 January 1945, RG24-G-3-1-a, Volume 10467, File 
212C1.2009 (D83), LAC. 
61  Bowell, The History of the Brigadier Royal Artillery Branch, 74.
62  XXX British Corps Operation Instruction No. 45, “Operation ‘VERITABLE’ 
Organisation of pepper pots,” 27 January 1945.
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rounds of medium machine gun ammunition, 69,000 40-millimetre 
shells, 14,000 4.2-inch mortar bombs and 12,000 17-pounder shells.63 
The 3rd and 4th Light Anti-Aircraft Regiment, RCA fired over 800 
rounds per gun and one battery reported that eleven of their twenty-
four barrels were so hot they were bulging.64
At 1000 hrs all preparatory firing ceased and those guns tasked 
to fire the supporting barrage began firing for thirty minutes on the 
opening line. The opening line of the barrage was situated close to the 
forward positions of 2nd Canadian Division. In order to ensure their 
safety, on 1 February Division Headquarters directed its brigades to 
withdraw their forward troops between 0100 and 0400 hrs on the 
morning of 8 February.65 At 1030 hrs the first lift of the barrage 
occurred and the assaulting forces moved out.66
The use of a barrage had become de rigueur in British and 
Canadian formations during the Normandy campaign, but thereafter 
fire plans consisting of timed concentrations or concentrations-on-
call were more prevalent.67 Indeed, Veritable was the only large-
scale barrage undertaken by Imperial arms since the closing of the 
Falaise Gap. A barrage was a manner of fire support developed 
during the First World War after its first large-scale use by the 
British during the Battle of Neuve Chappelle in March 1915. Several 
versions eventually emerged: a creeping barrage which, as the name 
implies, creeps forward in a series of timed lifts of 100-300 yards; a 
standing barrage consisting of a stationary wall of fire to suppress 
an objective, obscure enemy observation or interdict enemy counter 
attacks; and a box barrage in which artillery fire would form a 
three- or four-sided perimeter around a friendly force that was 
consolidating on an objective.
When firing a concentration, batteries would concentrate fire on a 
single target area. Timed concentrations were concentrations that were 
63  CMHQ 185, 61.
64  Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 406.
65  WD, 5th Canadian Infantry Brigade, “Line of FDLs – VERITABLE,” 1 February 
1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 14110, Reel T-11343, File 185, LAC, accessed 20 September 
2020, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_t11343/765?r=0&s=3.
66  “VERITABLE” Discussions with CCRA, 25 January 1945, 1, RG24-G-3-1-a, 
Volume 10467, File 212C1.2009 (D83), LAC; and WD, 5th Field Regiment, Royal 
Canadian Artillery, “RCA 2 Cdn Inf Div OO No. 1 Op VERITABLE,” 6 February 
1945, 1, RG24-C-3, Volume 14446, File 160, LAC. 
67  See Stig H. Moberg, Gunfire! British Artillery in World War II (Barnsley: 
Frontline Books, 2017), Chapters 20-22.
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engaged in accordance with the fire plan schedule. Concentrations-
on-call, however, were unscheduled fire missions fired at targets of 
opportunity or previously unidentified enemy positions the assaulting 
force happened upon during the advance.
When calls for concentrations were made, code names were 
employed that clearly indicated the number of guns required to 
engage a target and thus expedite the fire mission. Horrocks recalled 
the awesome power he had at his disposal, stating:
If I wanted the fire of all the seventy-two 25-pounder field guns of 
any division to be concentrated on one target, my Gunner Brigadier 
(CCRA) would merely have to get in touch with [CRA] at the division 
concerned and ask for an ‘Uncle’ target to be fired. If a target was 
sufficiently important to warrant all, or most, of the Corps Artillery 
being employed, this was called a ‘Victor’ target; this might involve 216 
field guns from three divisions, and perhaps 128 medium and heavy (5.5-
inch, 7.2-inch and 155-mm calibres) guns of two Army Groups R.A….
In a matter of minutes, therefore, about 400 guns could be brought into 
action where I wanted them.68
If a target worthy of engagement at the Corps level was encountered, 
the CCRA of XXX British Corps directed that Victor targets could 
be answered by all guns within range, with the exception of those 
guns that were firing on a guaranteed timed programme, namely 
the barrage, or tasked to provide defensive fire. For this reason, 
and due to the surplus artillery, batteries were often designated 
as being “superimposed” on barrage shoots. Those batteries so 
designated still fired on a barrage, but their fire augmented that 
of another battery. If an Uncle or Victor target call for fire was 
received, those batteries that were designated as “superimposed” 
could engage the concentration-on-call without fear of leaving the 
barrage without fire support.69
A critical element of the effectiveness of these rapid concentrations 
was the employment of survey teams to accurately plot the locations of 
batteries, for it was only with an accurate understanding of the firing 
unit’s location with respect to the target that accurate trigonometric 
calculations could be made to engage the target. Horrocks testified 
68  Horrocks et al., Corps Commander, 177.
69  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 266.
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to the extreme importance of artillery survey in the Imperial armies 
when he stated that “the core of the Royal Artillery was the fantastic 
accuracy of their Survey Units.”70 Thirty British Corps had in its 
order of battle the services of 4th Survey Regiment, RA while II 
Canadian Corps had the services of 2nd Canadian Survey Regiment, 
RCA. All divisions, including the reserve divisions, were allocated a 
detachment from the Survey Regiment. 
Each CRA was tasked with producing the fire plan in support 
of his particular division. Once each divisional fire plan was 
completed, it was passed to the CCRA and his staff to meld 
into one Corps-level fire plan.71 Due to the nature of the terrain, 
twisting somewhat to the right after the line of departure, the axis 
of advance of the four assaulting divisions had to wheel slightly 
to the right as well, necessitating a slight wheel to the barrage 
which resulted in an irregular shape. See Image 2 for a graphical 
representation of the barrage.
Three of the four initial assaulting divisions chose to employ a 
barrage to support their advance. The form of these barrages was as 
follows: two field regiments fired a mix of high explosive and smoke 
rounds, starting on the line of departure seventy minutes before 
H-hour in order to provide a protective wall of fire and smoke as the 
assaulting infantry and tanks shook out into their assault formations. 
At H-hour, three more field regiments and three to four medium 
regiments were superimposed in four rows of fire to a depth of 500 
yards. Anticipating an infantry rate of advance of about 100 yards 
every four minutes—slightly slower than the doctrinal rate of 100 
yards every three minutes—the barrage line “lifted,” or advanced, 
300 yards every twelve minutes. To signal to the infantry that the 
barrage was about to lift, one minute prior to the lift one gun per 
troop fired one yellow smoke. The barrage paused 30-60 minutes on 
each intermediate objective and 30 minutes on the final objective. 
The anticipated duration of the barrage was six and a half hours.72 
Noteworthy in Image 2, no barrage lanes were included for 51st 
Highland Division. In this particular case, the Divisional Commander, 
Major-General (Maj.-Gen.) Thomas G. Rennie, decided against using 
70  Horrocks et al., Corps Commander, 177.
71  Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, “CRA 
2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 2, RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC. 
72  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 265-66.
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a barrage and instead chose to use a series of timed concentrations. 
He felt that the enemy locations in his boundaries had been accurately 
located and preferred to have his fire support concentrated on those 
locations rather than dispersed in a barrage where they may not fall 
on an enemy location at all.73 Any unforeseen enemy targets before 
the 51st Highland Division could be addressed by concentrations-on-
call fire missions. 
Although the gunners of 51st Highland Division decided to use a 
timed programme of concentrations instead of a barrage, by the time 
of Veritable there was a debate in the Canadian Army about fire plans 
devised with the exclusive use of concentrations-on-call. In a series 
of doctrinal and tactical notes released by the BRA Branch of First 
Canadian Army known as “HQ RCA First Canadian Army Notes,” 
a passage in the second edition, published in mid-December 1944, 
argued that “[concentrations]-on-call, with no pre-arranged timed 
73  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 266.
Image 2: Trace of XXX British Corps Barrage. [Headquarters 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal 
Canadian Artillery, “CRA 2 Div Report, Op VERITABLE,” 2, RG24-C-3, Volume 14324, File 154, LAC]
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programme in addition, are not a satisfactory way of supporting an 
[organised] attack.”74 While the anonymous author, doubtless a staff 
officer in the BRA branch, admitted there were some undeniable 
benefits to employing concentrations-on-call, such as an economy of 
ammunition and increased flexibility, he warned they must be used in 
addition to a timed programme rather than in lieu of one. He pointed 
out that a fire plan solely reliant on concentrations-on-call would get 
no fire support at all if communications faltered, that there would be 
confusion arising from multiple calls for fire from forward observers 
and infantry commanders and there was the distinct possibility of 
missions called by infantry commanders falling on friendly troops if 
no clearance of fires were conducted. Further, the author lamented 
a recent trend away from planned barrages and he urged readers to 
employ a mix of on-call and planned fire support, opining: “it is felt 
that the barrage has been neglected lately and that if [ammunition] 
is in sufficient [supply], it, together with [concentrations]-on-call, 
will [supply] the answer to the [tactical] problem, when the enemy 
situation is not clearly known.”75 
Both methods of fire support had benefits and drawbacks that 
the manoeuvre commander and his CRA had to consider. A timed 
barrage provided continuous fire support across the assaulting frontage 
that hit not only identified enemy positions, but also any positions 
that had not as yet been identified. Although this was obviously 
beneficial, the extended linear barrage fire was diluted across the 
front and many rounds were fired that landed nowhere near the 
enemy. Moreover, the time that was required to produce a barrage, 
requiring as it did a large number of calculations, meant they were 
most effective during deliberate “teed-up” assaults, such as Veritable, 
when there was sufficient lead time for battery- and troop-command 
posts to complete the technical preparations.
Timed concentrations, however, provided a much heavier weight 
of concentrated fire on identified enemy positions at the cost of 
the inherent, albeit diluted, suppressive fire on unidentified enemy 
positions that was provided by the linear barrage. This drawback 
notwithstanding, timed concentrations were easier and faster to 
74  “HQ RCA First Canadian Army Notes No. 2,” 6, RG24-C-3, Volume 14306, File 
1150, LAC. Emphasis in original.
75  “HQ RCA First Canadian Army Notes No. 2,” 6, RG24-C-3, Volume 14306, File 
1150, LAC.
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plan as the targets were less numerous and the dozens of minute 
calculations required by the multitudinous lifts of a barrage were not 
required. During operations when there was little preparation time, or 
when the enemy’s disposition was well known, timed concentrations 
provided a much more effective and efficient fire support solution.
Returning now to the assault, as the barrage lifted off the start 
line, the three newly arrived British divisions passed through the 
depth positions of 2nd Canadian Division and then the four divisions 
moved forward simultaneously over a six-mile frontage. The initial 
advance of XXX British Corps progressed well, particularly on 
the left where there was less resistance from the enemy. The guns 
hammered away at their targets unceasingly during the course of 
the day and the infantry was able to follow the barrage closely. By 
1830 hrs, 2nd Canadian Division had managed to secure its objective 
of the town of Wyler and two and a half hour later the Canadian 
combat engineers had cleared the routes of mines.76
At 1700 hrs, 3rd Canadian Division began its assault northwards 
supported by a barrage from its divisional artillery and assisted by 
gunners of 2nd Canadian Division and Corps reinforcing artillery. 
Rising waters caused by the spring melt and blown dikes had surged 
over the Quer Dam a mile and a half above Wyler, causing the entire 
northern flank of First Canadian Army to flood. Third Canadian 
Division had to forgo the original plan of following tanks along hard 
surfaces and adopted amphibious vehicles much as they had done 
during the Scheldt campaign. By midnight of 8/9 February, the five 
assaulting divisions had all entered Germany, seized their objectives 
and taken over 1,200 prisoners. Resistance had been light; the greatest 
obstacle to the XXX British Corps advance had been the poor state 
of roads, soggy terrain and the widespread emplacement of mines 
by the Germans.77 By 1900 hrs, reconnaissance parties for artillery 
regiments that were slated to move forward rolled out of regimental 
areas towards their new battery positions. 
The 13th Field Regiment, RCA moved during the night of 8/9 
February and was happy to report in its war diary that it was the 
first Canadian field regiment to deploy on “the sacred soil of the 
76  CMHQ 155, 28.
77  CMHQ 155, 29.
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‘Third Reich.’”78 Doubtless the men were happy to finally be taking 
the war to the Germans, but they found getting into their new 
positions was difficult. One troop attempted to pull its guns onto the 
position, but the gun tractors got bogged down in the mud before they 
could reach the gun platforms, forcing the guns to deploy where they 
were. Another troop had to deploy alongside the road, necessitating 
them stopping traffic when the guns fired.79 Additionally, many of 
their new positions were heavily mined, causing four casualties: two 
killed and two wounded. Similarly, when the reconnaissance party 
of 3rd Medium Regiment headed out to secure a new gun area, the 
reconnaissance vehicle hit a mine en route. Fortunately, no one was 
killed, but the Regimental Second in Command “received a crack on 
the head.”80
On D+1, 9 February, an intense rain began, exacerbating the 
movement challenges for the assaulting divisions and restricting the 
use of air support. Although the breaching of the Siegfried Line was 
initially planned to occur at 0400 hrs on 9 February, it was delayed 
until 2100 hrs.81 Third Canadian Division continued its amphibious 
advance while the 15th Scottish Division was able to pierce the 
Siegfried Line between Kranenburg and Nutterdern. Fifty-third 
Welsh Division made good advances, but its supply route became 
unmanageable due to the poor state of the roads, necessitating the 
diversion of resupply onto the 15th Scottish Division routes. The 
Scots managed approach and enter the Reichswald itself. 
The 12th Field Regiment, RCA moved forward on 9 February into 
gun positions near the town of Beek. One of its batteries eventually 
ended up firing from a gun position situated in several feet of water. 
The regimental historian recalled that every time the gun fired, the 
barrel recoiled and submerged the breech in water. He remarked that 
it was “one way of keeping them cool but it was rather hard on the 
number two [who operated the lanyard] if he had no bathing suit!”82 
When 12th Field Regiment, RCA moved again several days later, the 
78  Lieutenant W. W. Barrett, The History of 13 Canadian Field Regiment Royal 
Canadian Artillery 1940-1945 (n.p., 1945), 106-07.
79  Barrett, The History of 13 Canadian Field Regiment, 106-07.
80  WD, 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA, 10 February 1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 14390, 
Reel T-15906, File 1050, LAC, accessed 12 March 2020, http://heritage.canadiana.
ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_t15906/102?r=1&s=1. 
81  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 267.
82  Bell, Into Action, 113.
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battery command post of 43 Battery had to build a raft and float 
their equipment out of the gun position.83
The 14th Field Regiment, RCA also moved on 9 February and 
occupied a position in the town of Wyler, recently cleared by the 
2nd Canadian Division. The original gun position was situated in 
the town of Beek, but as the reconnaissance parties moved out, they 
found the town inundated and instead moved to Wyler. Unfortunately, 
as with 13th Field Regiment, RCA the area was heavily mined. On 
11 February, the 14th Field Regiment, RCA moved once again, this 
time to the west of Cleve. On their way forward they passed through 
the town of Kranenburg where there was two feet of water over the 
road. Arriving in their new position, they were soon surrounded by 
water and the regiment could only be resupplied by the amphibious 
DUKWs (known as Ducks) and Buffaloes. They received no fresh 
rations for three days and mail had to be dropped by aircraft into the 
Regimental Headquarters area.84
By 9 February, the Germans realised from where the thrust of 
the attack was coming and dispatched reinforcements in the form of 
7th Para Division to the area. A grey and cloudy day prevented the 
Allies from using air support to their advantage, but D+1 saw the 
first Victor target fired by XXX British Corps, which was called for 
at 2200 hrs.85 Overnight 9/10 February, 43rd Wessex Division passed 
through 15th Scottish Division to continue the advance.
The advance continued slowly on 10 February and fortunately 
for the Allies the skies cleared to allow use of air support. Until 
this point, most of 2nd Canadian Division was still situated around 
Nijmegen. After capturing Wyler on D-day, the Division, and its 
artillery, did not play much of a role. The initial advance was so 
rapid, the guns in the 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery soon risked 
being out of range to support. By 10 February, the war diarist of 4th 
Field Regiment, RCA observed that “Op VERITABLE has squeezed 
us out so that we are now out of range, an indication that all is going 
83  Bell, Into Action, 117.
84  G. E. M. Ruffee, The History of the 14 Field Regiment 1940-1945 (Amsterdam: 
Wereldbibliotheek, 1945), 45-46.
85  WD, Headquarters, 2nd Canadian Divisional Artillery, Royal Canadian Artillery, 
Arty OP Log, 9 February 1945, RG24-C-3, LAC.
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quite well.”86 Despite this optimism, it was on this day that German 
counter attacks began to manifest in force. A four-day period of 
intense counter attacks and slow advances followed as more German 
forces came into the area, including 16 Para Regiment of 6th Para 
Division and elements of XLVII Panzer Corps. The return of rain 
and cloud cover deprived the Allies the use of their overwhelming 
air superiority, causing them to rely more and more on the use of 
artillery to break up German attacks.
The 7th Medium Regiment, RCA moved forward on 11 February 
and the war diarist recorded that 12th Medium Battery had trouble 
getting its guns into position due to the muddy terrain. The battery 
enlisted the assistance of an armoured bulldozer but still could only 
get one gun into position. The other guns were left on the road and 
a whole new area was found for the battery the next day.87 On 12 
February, as 7th Medium Regiment, RCA moved forward, it found 
that the only road available was flooded and only its 60-cwt trucks 
could get through. The regiment’s water wagons were cut off, so 
the gunners had to drink the plentiful local water after purification. 
When the commander of 2nd Canadian AGRA came to visit the 
gunners of 7th Medium Regiment, he was floated to their position 
on an amphibious ‘Weasel’ vehicle. 88 There are also numerous stories 
about Canadian gunners, particularly the forward observers, getting 
stranded on “islands” as the waters rose around them. One forward 
observer of 7th Medium Regiment, Captain Spencer, was stranded 
on an “island” near the town of Milligan. His comrades were not 
too worried, however, as a large number of local civilians—the war 
diarist made sure to highlight they were attractive German women—
and a large number of barn animals had sought refuge on the island 
with him.89
86  WD, 4th Canadian Field Regiment, RCA, 10 February 1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 
14442, Reel T-15964, File 155, LAC, accessed 12 March 2020, http://heritage.
canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_t15964/72?r=1&s=1.
87  WD, 7th Medium Regiment, RCA, 11 February 1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 14402, 
Reel T-15918, File 238, LAC, accessed 12 March 2020, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/
view/oocihm.lac_reel_t15918/1227?r=1&s=3. 
88  WD, 7th Medium Regiment, RCA, 12 February 1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 14402, 
Reel T-15918, File 238, LAC, accessed 12 March 2020, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/
view/oocihm.lac_reel_t15918/1227?r=1&s=3.
89  WD, 4th Medium Regiment, RCA, 14 February 1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 14394, 
Reel T-15910, File 1051, LAC, accessed 23 March 2020, http://heritage.canadiana.
ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_t15910/1010?r=1&s=3.
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On 13 February, the German 84th Infantry Division, which had 
been mauled by the initial bombardment and Allied assault, was 
pulled out of the line for rest. By the morning of 14 February, the 
Reichswald was reported clear. The same day, the clouds broke and 
the Allied air forces were once again able to influence the battle. 
Three days later, war diarist of the 4th Field Regiment observed: 
“Activity – limited to following the advancing red lines on the map. If 
it keeps on we will probably be evicted from our HQ by Corps, we’re 
really that far back.”90
Crerar’s initial plan had been to bring II Canadian Corps into the 
battle on 9 February. Although the Phase One objectives had been met 
on schedule, the increasing delay caused by German reinforcements 
and the worsening road conditions caused him to delay that decision. 
Finally, on 14 February, Crerar ordered II Canadian Corps to take 
over the left of the Army frontage, taking under command 2nd and 
3rd Canadian Divisions effective at noon on 15 February. Second 
Canadian Corps felt the sting of the poor lines of communication 
as the rising waters and mud forced them and XXX British Corps 
to rely on a single supply route, supplemented by ferry service. At 
the same time, 52nd Lowland Division came into the line while 53rd 
Welsh Division was put in reserve.
One of the final acts of the operation was the 7th Canadian 
Brigade’s operation against Moyland Wood. As the fight progressed, 
the guns of 12th Field Regiment’s 16 Battery were deployed in 
the only dry area they could find, which happened to be only six 
hundred yards from the infantry’s front line. One of the gun layers 
was wounded by sniping from Germans in the wood line.91 The 7th 
Medium Regiment had mobility difficulties on 20 February when 
moving forward, once again having to rely on assistance from tanks 
and bulldozers to pull the guns into their new position.92
The First Canadian Army’s assault was slowly grinding down. 
The horrible road conditions coupled with the influx of German 
reinforcements ensured the original objectives of Veritable would not 
90  WD, 4th Field Regiment, RCA, 13 February 1945, RG24-C-3. Volume 14442, Reel 
T-15964, File 155, LAC, accessed 6 August 2021, https://heritage.canadiana.ca/
view/oocihm.lac_reel_t15964/73?r=1&s=3.   
91  Bell, Into Action, 117.
92  WD, 7th Medium Regiment, RCA, 20 February 1945, RG24-C-3, Volume 14402, 
Reel T-15918, File 238, LAC, accessed 12 March 2020, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/
view/oocihm.lac_reel_t15918/1229?r=1&s=3.
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be achieved. By 19 February this had become obvious to Crerar 
and he set his staff to work on a sequel operation, Blockbuster, to 
be launched after a brief pause to reorganise and tee up another 
deliberate assault. Attacks towards Goch and Weeze continued and, 
for all intents and purposes, Veritable ended on 24 February. 
conclusion
A total of 5,953 tons of munitions were fired during Veritable, 
consisting of 450,997 shells and over two million machine gun 
rounds.93 This was truly a massive undertaking and represented, at 
that point in the war, the largest fire plan undertaken by Imperial 
arms, although it was to be eclipsed several weeks later by the 
massive Anglo-American fire plan in support of Operation Plunder, 
the crossing of the Rhine River. What did such an outlay of munitions 
achieve? What can be learned from this expenditure of rounds?
The Veritable fire plan provides an excellent case study of the 
characteristics of predicted artillery fire—fire directed against 
targets based solely on trigonometric calculations. Unlike observed 
fire, where an observer confirms the fire hits the target, predicted fire 
is not adjusted onto the target, thus its accuracy is contingent on the 
accuracy of the target location as well as the accuracy of the surveyed 
gun position and compensation for non-standard conditions such as 
air temperature, air density, wind speed and direction. In the days 
after the launch of Veritable, a team of Instructors-in-Gunnery (IGs) 
surveyed the battlefield and visited Allied battery locations, verified 
the accuracy of survey and meteorological calculations and conducted 
a ground check of impact craters on the barrage lanes and identified 
hostile battery locations. 
In reviewing command post logs, the IGs team identified some 
errors in the calculation of firing data by the First Canadian Army 
batteries, but they determined these had a minimal influence on 
overall accuracy. A far more profound impact on the precision of 
the artillery fire was caused by inaccuracy of the meteorological 
calculations. These inaccuracies accounted for the Mean Point of 
Impact of artillery concentrations landing an average of 250 yards 
to the northwest of intended targets, although the worst example of 
93  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 262.
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inaccuracy was 700 yards. Consequently, the IGs concluded, only 5.1 
per cent of the artillery rounds fired in concentrations landed within a 
hundred yards of the intended target.94 Of course, this dispersion was 
equally applicable to the concentrations fired as part of the counter 
battery programme. A similar result occurred during the barrage. 
The IGs determined that some rounds fell short of the line of fire as 
much as 200 yards, although the density of impact craters increased 
nearer the barrage lines.95
As a result of these inaccuracies, the destructive effect of the 
artillery on German men and materiel during Veritable was minor; 
only about 2-3 per cent of German casualties resulted from artillery 
and of the twenty-eight German guns that were engaged during 
counter-battery fire, the IGs determined five were probably hit and 
seven were withdrawn.96 Given such meagre results, why then did the 
IGs team determine that the Veritable fire plan was “conspicuously 
successful”? The answer is that the Veritable fire plan demonstrated 
the true value of artillery lay not in its destructive effects as much 
as in its morale effects, namely its ability to suppress the enemy and 
prevent their movement and retaliatory firing.97
The IGs found that the fire plan density of 650-1,300 field and 
medium shells per kilometre was sufficient to cut all line communication 
to the German forward area. Additionally, a rate of one-to-two 
shells every minute, landing within 200 yards of an enemy position, 
suppressed the Germans and kept officers and men in their shelters 
while six rounds per minute within the same distance neutralised the 
troops altogether.98 The sheer weight of the fire, although not precise, 
served to force the enemy to ground and keep him from manning his 
defences. Brig. Pemberton noted that:
94  “Report No. 31. The Accuracy of Predicted Fire: Operation VERITABLE” in 
Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest Europe, The Work of 
No. 2 Operational Research Section with 21 Army Group June 1944 to July 1945, ed. 
Terry Copp (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University, 2000), 296-98.
95  “Report No. 31. The Accuracy of Predicted Fire: Operation VERITABLE,” in 
Montgomery’s Scientists, 298.
96  “Report No. 26. Fire Support in Operation VERITABLE: Effect on Forward 
Defensive Positions” in Montgomery’s Scientists, 361; and “Report No. 29. Effect of 
Counter-Battery Fire in Operation VERITABLE” in Montgomery’s Scientists, 338.
97  “Report No. 26. Fire Support in Operation VERITABLE: Effect on Forward 
Defensive Positions” in Montgomery’s Scientists, 361.
98  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 267.
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His troops, particularly those of the 84th Division, appeared to find the 
moral effects of our artillery fire devastating. Suffering from the nervous 
strain of the prolonged bombardment, prisoners stated that they had 
the impression of being opposed by overwhelming forces which it was 
useless to resist…during the barrage it was impossible to send runners 
or to move local reserves.99
Perhaps more to the point is the following extract from a German 
prisoner recorded in the history of the BRA Branch: “what gets you 
down is the unending harassing fire – that’s what makes your nerves 
go kaput! You get so you don’t risk going out [of the bunker] to 
relieve yourself!”100
Despite the small number of hostile artillery pieces destroyed 
by the counter-battery programme, it was nonetheless deemed a 
success by the IGs team who noted that very little defensive fire came 
from the German guns during the assault. One German prisoner 
reported that half of the guns in his unit had been destroyed. And 
yet, even when guns were not destroyed, the German gunners were 
nonetheless suppressed by the sheer volume of fire and unable to man 
their equipment. The XXX British Corps Counter Battery Officer 
recorded one instance of guns being overrun by Allied infantry where 
the guns were reported as being brand new and appeared to have 
been abandoned without having been fired.101 One captured German 
gun detachment commander admitted to being unable to fire his gun 
during the barrage due to the counter-battery fire and in another case 
a gun crew admitted that they sought shelter in a reinforced bunker 
until the barrage passed by them and upon emerging to man their 
gun found three Allied tanks and supporting infantry occupying their 
position.102 Perhaps the blunt assessment provided by the IGs report 
99  Pemberton, Development of Artillery Tactics and Equipment, 267.
100  Boswell, The History of the Brigadier Royal Artillery Branch, 74.
101  WD, 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA, “XXX British Corps Counter Battery 
Intelligence Report No. 150,” RG24-C-3, Volume 14390, Reel T-15906, File 1050, 
LAC, accessed 6 August 2021, http://heritage.canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_
t15906/166?r=0&s=3. 
102  WD, 4th Medium Regiment, RCA, “As the Germans Saw It,” RG24-C-3, Volume 
14394, Reel T-15910, File 1051, LAC, accessed 12 March 2020, http://heritage.
canadiana.ca/view/oocihm.lac_reel_t15910/1042?r=0&s=3.
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best illustrates the effectiveness of the counter-battery fire: “enemy 
artillery fire was not a source of trouble on that day.”103
The most significant finding of the IGs was that the number of 
shells fired was more important than the weight of shell fired and 
to that end their reports stressed the added value of the pepper 
pot in augmenting the fire plan.104 The effectiveness of such a large 
expenditure of munitions had a down side, however, leaving the terrain 
pockmarked and difficult to manoeuvre over. After the operation, the 
commanding officer of the 1st Battalion of the Gordon Highlanders 
suggested that the artillery fire was excessive and resulted in too 
much mud and destruction that delayed the advance of the infantry. 
He recommended that future fire plans should be shorter with the 
infantry following close behind.105 
Notwithstanding the Gordon Highlanders’ commanding officer’s 
observations, what is clear is that the success of the Veritable 
operation was due in no small part to the suppressive effects of the 
immense artillery fire plan and supporting pepper pot, an effect 
which was only achievable with the appropriate number of guns, 
ammunition and a robust command and control network to plan and 
execute it. What the Veritable fire plan demonstrates is that after 
five years of war, the fire support system of the First Canadian Army 
had achieved a level of efficiency and effectiveness that allowed it 
to literally blast its way through German defences. The number of 
guns, the network of communications, the novel weapons and the 
sheer amount of munitions available are indicative of five years of 
industrial output, technological evolution and doctrinal refinement. 
The confluence of these developments outside Nijmegen in February 
1945 allowed the gunners of First Canadian Army to execute the 
Veritable fire plan with a calculated and terrible efficiency in the face 
of adverse weather conditions, complex terrain and a depleted but 
nonetheless resilient enemy. 
103  “Report No. 29. Effect of Counter-Battery Fire in Operation VERITABLE” in 
Montgomery’s Scientists, 339.
104  “Report No. 26. Fire Support in Operation VERITABLE: Effect on Forward 
Defensive Positions” in Montgomery’s Scientists, 361.
105  Bailey, Field Artillery and Firepower, 326 n135.
34
Canadian Military History, Vol. 30 [2021], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol30/iss1/6
  35G R E B S TA D 
appendix a: list of acronyms
AGRA Army Group, Royal Artillery
Bde Brigade
BRA Brigadier Royal Artillery
Brig. Brigadier
Capt. Captain
CCRA Commander Corps Royal Artillery
CDA Canadian Divisional Artillery
Cdn Canadian
CRA Commander Royal Artillery








RA  Royal Artillery
RCA Royal Canadian Artillery
Regt Regiment
SP  Self-propelled
VT  Variable Time
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
about the author
Colonel David W. Grebstad grew up in Dryden, ON, received his BA 
from the University of Manitoba (1996), his MA in Military History from the 
University of New Brunswick (2012) and his MDS from the Royal Military 
College of Canada (2013). He has served over thirty years as an artillery 
officer in the Canadian Army, in both the Primary Reserve and the Regular 
Force, including operational tours in Afghanistan, Italy and Egypt. He is 
currently employed as the Director of Peacekeeping Policy in the Director 
General, International Security Policy branch of the Department of National 
Defence. He has authored a number of publications in several peer-reviewed 
historical journals including Manitoba History, Canadian Military History 
and The Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research. He and his 
wife Colleen, a Health Services Officer in the Canadian Armed Forces, live 
in Ottawa.
35
Grebstad: “A Calculated and Terrible Efficiency”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2021
